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The recent Euskadi ta Alkartasuna (ETA) ceasefire declaration has been received with much 
interest and fanfare by the international media. The same announcement was met instead with a 
tangible lack of enthusiasm by Spanish and Basque political figures.  The Spanish president 
Zapatero, the Basque president Lopez and Urkullu, the leader of the most voted Basque 
nationalist party (PNV), agreed that the communiqué was a ‘step forward’ but ultimately 
‘insufficient’ and ‘not the news the country had been hoping for’. Such mix of scepticism and 
disappointment is partly a product of the previous failed experience with the 2006 ETA truce. 
Months of painstakingly slow negotiations between ETA and government representatives were 
then shattered with a bomb attack at Madrid airport that killed two people. The outcome left the 
Zapatero’s government frustrated and unwilling to get their fingers burnt again.
Yet there are in fact a few interesting divergences from the 2006 ceasefire. The use of words 
‘general’ and ‘verifiable by the international community’ are new and help to separate this 
statement from the 2006 declaration, which was also ‘permanent’. The latter has already been 
rejected by the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Rubalcaba: Spain will not accept the involvement 
of international mediators and any hypothetical disarmament process would be verified by the 
Spanish security forces. The former is more relevant in practice as it would involve the 
termination of ‘kale borroka’ (street fighting) activities and the extortion of Basque businessmen 
under the so-called ‘revolutionary tax’. There is an additional novelty:  a commitment for a 
‘lasting resolution towards an end to the armed confrontation’.  This phrase has never been used 
by ETA before but it comes with the caveat that the dissolution of the group should follow the 
fulfilment of political conditions such as territoriality and self-determination.  
So it is not quite a familiar case of ‘more of the same’ and the government’s response may be 
viewed by some, not least by Gerry Adams, as a missed opportunity ‘for a lasting peace and a 
new beginning in the relationship between the Basque people and the Spanish state’. At the same 
time, it is not hard to understand this response if we examine the current security and political 
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context. There is a clear strategic logic behind the Spanish government decision: from their point 
of view, the current approach is working. ETA is terminally ill, having been hit hard by not only 
hundreds of arrests in recent years product of close French-Spanish cooperation but also the 
impact of the judicial investigations that since the late 1990s have dismantled their intricate 
support network. The general view within the socialist party and the state’s judicial and police 
authorities is that they have the upper hand and there is little need for a change in tactics. Proof 
that the pressure has not wavered comes from the recent arrests of two alleged ETA members in 
France and, in a separate operation, 10 members of EKIN, ETA’s political apparatus.  
However a much less talked about motive for the government’s reaction is rather more 
pedestrian: electoral politics. Opening negotiations again is seen as a politically very risky move 
in a context where the economic crisis is rapidly eroding the party’s support amongst the Spanish 
electorate.  The socialists are not willing to lose ground on this matter and will attempt to out-
toughen the opposition and play hard-ball with ETA’s demands. 
Importantly, electoral politics not only helps us to contextualise the Government’s response, they 
are also crucial to understand ETA’s decision to announce a ceasefire on the first place. It is clear 
by now that ETA is militarily very weak, totally incapable to bring the independence of the 
Basque region by force of arms alone.  A November 2010 poll by Basque Country University 
puts the backing of ETA’s violent methods down to about 3% of the Basques. Incidentally, 
support for independence comes to 28% of the population.  Whereas ETA’s young ranks continue 
with their enthusiastic advocacy of violent action, the older generations have grown disenchanted 
and dissension within imprisoned members means that the numbers of those supportive of a 
political solution within the group are growing. The future prospects look bleak for the terrorist 
organisation. 
On the other hand, the main source of pressure for the 2011 declaration has not come internally 
but from Batasuna, the group’s political wing. The explanation again comes from political 
calculations: banned since 2003 following a court ruling that provided evidence of operational 
support to ETA, Batasuna leaders have grown concerned of losing ground to other pro-
independence Basque political parties. After losing a third of their support, the fear is that these 
legal parties that work within the institutions and oppose ETA violence would continue attracting 
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the votes of their traditional electorate while they stand in the wilderness outside the normal 
political process. Eusko Alkartasuna  (EA) would benefit much from the continuation of the 
present situation: a party that has participated in several Basque regional governments in 
coalition with PNV, it supports similar economic policies and political goals.  Alternatiba and 
Aralar, a scion of the old Batasuna, are other potential beneficiaries.  Trapped and increasingly 
irrelevant, Batasuna needs to return to the institutions in the next elections and they can only do 
so by renouncing their support for violence and severing their operational links with ETA. A 
legalised Batasuna could then establish a united pro-independence left-wing political front with 
EA and Alternatiba and regain their footing in Basque politics. The imprisoned leadership’s 
strategy is backed now by a majority of the Batasuna base and it is obvious that an inactive ETA 
would greatly assist in the process. 
In sum, the banning of Batasuna has eventually encouraged their leaders to put pressure on ETA 
for a ceasefire that would facilitate their legalisation and subsequent participation in the next 
local and regional elections. Attention will be shifted then to whether the Spanish judicature rules 
the new name, lists and rules compliant with the Ley de Partidos.  If so, this would help to 
validate their strategy and encourage Batasuna’s leadership to impose their views on ETA’s 
leadership for the very first time. If Batasuna’s proxy is rejected –as with other previous 
attempts- there will be a renewed internal debate: will this strengthen the desire of Batasuna’s 
top-ranks for a non-violent path to the independence of Basque country? Or will this give 
arguments to the more hardcore elements in ETA and the dissenting minority within the party 
that a return to terrorism is necessary?  
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